In this paper I consider games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to in ‡uence the decisions of a common agent. I focus on the problem of characterizing the equilibrium outcomes of such games. I …rst show that, to solve this problem, one can invoke neither Myerson's Inscrutability Principle, which holds in agency games with one informed principal, nor the Extended Taxation Principle, which holds in commonagency games with uninformed principals. I then provide two characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes: one for games in which the principals delegate the …nal decisions to the agent, and one for games in which they participate with the agent in making such decisions.
Introduction
Common-agency games model settings in which multiple principals non-cooperatively contract with a single agent. 1 These games have proved useful to study many economic problems, such as the possibility of tacit collusion and its implications for antitrust regulation, the consequences of multilateral lobbying on government policies, and the optimality of common vs. exclusive retailers in wholesale trade. Until very recently (Martimort and Moreira (2010) ), the literature has focused on common-agency games (hereafter, games for short) in which principals have no private information. Many environments, however, correspond to games with informed principals. For example, Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) consider menu auctions in which the bidders (the principals) submit bidding schemes to the auctioneer (the agent) who then freely chooses a revenue-maximizing allocation. In their model, the bidders are uninformed, although it seems natural to allow for informed bidders as in standard auction settings. More recently, Martimort and Moreira (2010) consider a model of public-good provision in which contributors (the principals) privately know their valuations of such a good and o¤er its provider (the agent) schemes that tie contributions to production.
The present paper studies the problem of how to characterize the outcomes-de…ned as maps from players'types (their information) to allocations-that can arise as equilibria of games with informed principals. 2 In these games, each principal commits to an arbitrary mechanism that speci…es an allocation-e.g., a contribution for the public good-as a function of how she and the agent communicate with the mechanism itself. Since the principals are informed, I consider both games in which each principal can communicate with her mechanisms (as in Myerson (1983) ), and games in which only the agent can do so. I refer to the …rst case as non-delegation games, and to the second case as delegation games.
Characterizing the outcomes of these games raises several di¢ culties because standard results in the literature do not apply when principals are informed. From the literature on games with uninformed principals, we know that we cannot invoke the Revelation Principle to characterize the agent's behavior. 3 This is because his behavior with one principal depends not only on his exogenous type, but also on the endogenous information that he learns by interacting with the other principals. Furthermore, in this paper I show that with informed principals two other wellknown principles fail: the Inscrutability Principle (Myerson 1983 ) and the Extended Taxation Principle-also known as Menu Theorem (Peters (2001) ) or Delegation Principle (Martimort and Stole (2002) ). 4 The Inscrutability Principle holds in non-delegation games in which there is only one principal and the principal is informed. 5 It says that, when characterizing the outcomes of such games, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the principal commits to the same mechanism 1 As a convention, throughout the paper I use feminine pronouns for the principals and masculine ones for the agent. 2 In contrast, Martimort and Moreira (2010) focus on a speci…c game and examine the e¢ ciency properties of a particular class of its equilibria. 3 For the Revelation Principle, see Gibbard (1973) , Green and La¤ont (1977) , and Myerson (1979) . For the inapplicability of the Revelation Principle to games with multiple principals, see Katz (1991) , McAfee (1993) , Peck (1997) , Epstein and Peters (1999) , Peters (2001) , and Martimort and Stole (2002) . 4 For the Taxation Principle, see Rochet (1985) and Guesnerie (1995). 5 As I will explain later, in delegation games the Inscrutability Principle does not apply even if there is only one informed principal.
independently of her type, thereby disregarding the possibility that she may want to choose di¤erent mechanisms to convey her information. This is not true in games with multiple informed principals. On the one hand, as noted, with multiple principals the agent's behavior with, say, principal 1 depends not only on his exogenous but also on his endogenous information about, say, principal 2. On the other hand, with informed principals the agent's endogenous information includes also what principal 2 conveys about her type with her choices of a mechanism. So, if principal 2 can let these choices depend on her types, she may be able to induce a behavior of the agent with principal 1 that otherwise cannot arise in equilibrium. This means that, in contrast to the games with one informed principal, in games with multiple informed principals signaling through mechanisms represents an essential strategic component.
As far as the Extended Taxation Principle is concerned, it says that one can characterize all the outcomes of a game in which uninformed principals compete in arbitrary mechanisms, by studying the equilibria of a simpler game in which the principals can o¤er only menus of allocations and delegate the …nal choices to the agent. This Principle is important because it provides a relatively practical framework to study all outcomes of a much more complicated game. Moreover, it represents perhaps the main solution suggested in the literature to the failure of the Revelation Principle, also because it avoids the in…nite regress problem that arises if one allows each principal to use mechanisms that depend on the agent's exogenous type as well as his endogenous information about the other principals. 6 The Extended Taxation Principle fails for the following reason when principals are informed. As noted, to sustain some outcomes, the principals need to control the information revealed up front by their choices of mechanisms. At the same time, they also need to restrict the options that their communication with the agent can induce, by committing to mechanisms that map to restricted menus of allocations. Clearly, in a delegation game each principal can achieve the second goal by simply o¤ering the agent her desired menu and letting him directly choose from it. However, with general mechanisms each principal can restrict the agent's choices to the same menu using di¤erent communication protocols, which may be essential to signal her desired amount of information. On the other hand, in a non-delegation game, with general mechanisms each principal can directly participate with the agent in choosing an allocation. But this participation is impossible when the principal must delegate the agent to choose from a menu. Thus, the principal may want to restrict such a menu to the allocations that she likes better given her type, but to do so she may have to reveal more information than she wants to.
Building on these remarks about the Inscrutability and the Extended Taxation Principles, I provide two characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of games with informed principalsone for delegation games and one for non-delegation games. In both cases I focus on (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which, conditional on their types, the principals do not randomize over mechanisms. Equilibria with this property represent the focus of (almost) the entire literature on games with uninformed principals-to the best of my knowledge, there is no paper that actually constructs an equilibrium with random choices of mechanisms. Moreover, from an applied perspective it seems hard to imagine, for instance, that bidders in a menu auction randomize over complicated bidding schemes or that competing sellers randomize over schemes of price-quantity pairs.
In the case of delegation games, I show that we can recover all outcomes that arise when principals compete in arbitrary mechanisms by …nding the equilibria of the following 'signal-menu game.'In this new game, the principals o¤er menus of allocations-as suggested by the Extended Taxation Principle-and also privately send a 'cheap talk'signal to the agent. Moreover, each principal's set of signals equals her set of types.
To characterize the outcomes of non-delegation games, I construct a di¤erent game in which each principal now o¤ers the agent a menu of direct mechanisms. For each menu, all DMs depend only on the principal's reports about her type and restrict such reports to a subset of her possible types. Such menus allow the agent to act on his exogenous and endogenous information by selecting di¤erent DMs, without causing any in…nite regress. At the same time, the DMs allow each principal to retain all her ability to participate with the agent in choosing an allocation. Furthermore, by letting a principal commit to reporting only a subset of her possible types, the restricted DMs allow her to signal that her true type belongs to that set. Finally, I show that we can recover all outcomes of the original non-delegation game by …nding the equilibria of the new game in which, after o¤ering a menu of DMs, each principal truthfully reports her type to the DM chosen by the agent.
This characterization suggests the following interpretation of non-delegation games with informed principals. In such games, it is as if each principal o¤ers the agent several instrumentsthe DMs-that he can use to screen her types. After observing all o¤ers, the agent chooses a DM for each principal, in a way that may depend on his type and on how he decides to screen the other principals. Finally, each principal truthfully reveals her type to the chosen DM. In other words, it is as if the principals accept to become 'agents of the agent'in a way that they partially control with their initial o¤ers.
Related Literature: As noted, this paper relates to the literature on mechanism design with one informed principal (Myerson (1983) ) and on common-agency games with uninformed principals ( This paper also relates to a recent literature on multilateral contracting games in which multiple, privately informed, parties sign mutual contracts (Peters (2010); Peters and Szentes (2011); Celick and Peters (2011) ). This literature has suggested several characterizations of the outcomes of multilateral contracting games. These games, however, di¤er from common-agency games in one crucial aspect that makes those characterizations inapplicable to the settings considered in the present paper. In multilateral contracting games, each party can communicate with all other parties and design contracts that depend on others'contracts-examples include international trade agreements and tax treaties. In common-agency games, instead, each principal can neither communicate with the other principals, nor make her mechanisms directly depend on their mechanisms-for example, because of antitrust regulation. This di¤erence signi…cantly changes the strategic nature of the games. In multilateral contracting games, each party can directly punish another party if, for instance, she deviates from a collusive behavior. On the other hand, in common-agency games any principal has to rely on the agent's collaboration and superior information to punish a deviating opponent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 is about the failure of the Inscrutability Principle. Section 4 is about the failure of the Extended Taxation Principle. Section 5 contains the main characterization results. The last section concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
I begin by describing the class of common-agency games on which I focus in this paper. The novelty of this class consists in allowing the principals to have private information.
Players and Information: There are N > 1 principals, denoted by i = 1; : : : ; N , and a common agent, denoted by i = 0. Before the game begins, each player i can privately receive some information in the form of a type i 2 i , where i is a …nite set-as usual, = N i=0 i and i = j6 =i j with elements and i . I assume that j i j > 1 for at least one principal i. Finally, the players commonly know that the types are distributed according to the joint probability distribution b over . This distribution need not feature independence across players.
Allocations and Mechanisms: Principals have full commitment and bargaining power. Each principal o¤ers the agent a mechanism to select an allocation for their bilateral relationship. The set of feasible allocations for principal i is the …nite set X i . For example, think of x i as a quantity together with its price in a relationship between a buyer and a seller, or a piece of regulation together with a kickback in a relationship between a politician (the agent) and a lobbyist (the principal).
To choose an allocation, principal i and the agent communicate using a certain language, which I model with …nite sets of messages. 7 Speci…cally, the set of messages that principal i can send to the agent is P i , and the set of messages that she can receive from the agent is A i . I assume that j i j jP i j, so that principal i can communicate what she privately knows; similarly, I assume that j j jA i j for every i = 1; : : : ; N , so that the agent can communicate to each principal what he privately knows as well as what he may learn about all principals by interacting with them. Formally, an indirect mechanism of principal i is a map m i :
that associates to each pair of messages (a i ; p i ) a decision d i 2 D i , which is a lottery over X i . For future reference, denote the range of a mechanism m i by Ra(m i ). The space of all indirect mechanisms of principal i is M i . 8 The agent can choose to interact only with some principals by rejecting the mechanisms o¤ered by the other principals. To model this possibility, I assume that each set A i contains a 'rejection' message a i such that sending a i to any mechanism m i is equivalent to rejecting it. Note that m i ( a i ; ) still depends on the messages of principal i, because she may still be able to a¤ect the …nal decision in D i even without the collaboration of the agent.
As is usual in common-agency games, the principals cannot directly interact among themselves. This means that, for every principal i, m i cannot directly depend on m i , nor can x i depend on x i ; moreover, principals cannot directly communicate among themselves. Timing: The game has two periods. In the …rst period, all principals simultaneously and non-cooperatively o¤er the agent their mechanisms. The agent observes all mechanisms, but no principal can observe the mechanisms of the other principals-i.e., this is a model of pri- 7 Of course, the assumption that the sets of messages are …nite entails some loss of generality. However, it ensures that continuation equilibria exist after any pro…le of mechanisms o¤ered by the principals (see De…nition 1). 8 To simplify notation, vate contracting. In the second period, both the agent and each principal simultaneously, 10 non-cooperatively, and privately send their messages to the respective mechanisms, which independently deliver an allocation x. The players then enjoy their payo¤s and the game is over.
Strategies and Updated Beliefs: Conditional on her type i , in period 1 each principal chooses a mechanism m i , and in period 2 she chooses a message p i given m i . As explained in the Introduction, my analysis focusses on equilibria in which principals choose their mechanisms as a deterministic function of their types. Therefore, a (behavior) strategy of principal i is a pair of (measurable) functions ( i ; i ), where i : i ! M i and i : i M i ! (P i ). Hereafter, I refer to i as the o¤er strategy and to i as the communication strategy of principal i. With regard to the agent, he chooses a pro…le of messages a as a function of his type 0 and the o¤ered mechanisms m. A (behavior) strategy of the agent is then a (measurable) function : 0 M ! (A). Hereafter, I refer to as the communication strategy of the agent. Finally, after observing a pro…le of o¤ered mechanisms, the agent will update his belief about the principals' types. For each m and 0 , I denote this updated belief with the conditional probability ( j 0 ; m) on 0 . Preferences and Payo¤s: Each player is an expected-utility maximizer. The vN-M utility function of principal i is u i : X ! R and that of the agent is v : X ! R. Using these functions, let V ( ; ; 0 ; m; ) be the expected payo¤ to the agent from the communication strategy pro…le ( ; ) = ( ;
), given that his type is 0 , he observes m, and he updates his beliefs according to . Similarly, let U i ; ; i ; m i ; i be the expected payo¤ to principal i from ( ; ), given that her type is i , she o¤ers m i , and her opponents play i . Finally, let U i ( ; ; ; i ) be the initial expected payo¤ to principal i from the strategy pro…le = ( ; ; ), given that her type is i .
Equilibrium Concept: I denote the game that I have just described by G. I focus on (weak) PBE of G in which principals play deterministic o¤er strategies as I de…ned above. Hereafter, the term 'equilibrium of G'refers to such a PBE. 
3. For every i = 1; : : : ; N , i 2 i , and m i 2 M i ,
4. Whenever possible, the belief satis…es Bayes rule given and b. 10 Although no principal i can observe m i at any stage in the game, one could consider the possibility that principals choose their messages after observing the agent's messages. Allowing for this possibility, however, adds no further generality to the analysis, as I will explain after presenting Theorem 2. As is common in the literature, I assume that an equilibrium of G exists. 12 Also, to denote a pro…le of communication strategies ( ; ) that satis…es conditions 1 and 2 in De…nition 1 given , I will use the term 'continuation equilibrium'of G. Note that, given any pro…le and o¤ered mechanisms m, a continuation equilibrium always exists because the message spaces are …nite. So, for any pro…le of mechanisms that the principals o¤er in the …rst period, the players' behavior in the continuation of the game is always well de…ned.
Non-Delegation and Delegation Games: In the game G, each principal can send messages to her mechanisms. This possibility allows the principal to a¤ect the …nal decisions, together with the agent, in the second period of the game. For this reason, hereafter I will refer to the game G as a 'non-delegation game.' However, in some economic environments of interest (see, e.g., Martimort and Moreira (2010)), the principals have to completely delegate the …nal decisions to the agent. To model this situation, I consider a class of games in which the outcomes of each mechanism can depend only on the agent's messages. As in the game G, each principal i must allow the agent to reject her mechanism m i by sending some message that leads to a 'default'decision d i (e.g., no trade). Since in G d the principals play no role after o¤ering their mechanisms, there is no communication strategy for them. The notion of equilibrium in De…nition 1 naturally extends to G d . Social-Choice Functions: My aim here is to characterize the outcomes that can arise as equilibria of the interaction between the principals and the agent. I represent such outcomes as social-choice functions f : ! (X).
Failure of the Inscrutability Principle
The so called Inscrutability Principle was …rst stated by Myerson in his 1983 seminal paper and is a fundamental result in the literature on mechanism design with one informed principal (see also Tirole (1990, 1992) ). Using Myerson's own words, the Inscrutability Principle says: "there is no loss of generality in assuming that all types of the principal should choose the same mechanism, so that his [...] choice [...] will convey no information." (p. 1774) Myerson considered a setting in which the informed principal can send messages to her mechanisms and therefore may not entirely delegate the …nal decisions to the agent. In this respect Myerson's setting is similar to the non-delegation game G.
The intuition behind the Inscrutability Principle is as follows. For simplicity, suppose that each type of the principal o¤ers a di¤erent mechanism, thereby revealing itself up front. After m, the updated belief must must satisfy
observing a mechanism, the agent replies by sending some messages that, together with the principal's messages, determine some …nal decision. The key observation here is that, conditional on the information revealed by the principal's o¤er, the agent's choices of messages depend only on his predetermined exogenous type. Therefore, if the principal knew the agent's type, she could replicate-on her own and without having to reveal any information up front-the di¤erent decisions that her types were originally implementing with that particular type of the agent by o¤ering di¤erent mechanisms. To induce the agent to reveal his type, the principal can commit to a single direct mechanism that works as follows: (1) the agent and the principal report one type each, and (2) for every pair of reports, the mechanism delivers the same decision that the reported types were implementing through the original mechanisms. It is easy to see that, under this new mechanism, truthful reporting is optimal for the agent if the principal behaves truthfully (and vice versa). So, the new uninformative mechanism allows the principal to implement the same decisions that she was implementing by revealing her information up front. 13 The Inscrutability Principle is extremely useful because it allows one to completely disregard that the informed principal may use her choice of a mechanism as a signalling device. It is therefore important to know whether it also applies to games with multiple informed principals. If so, we could safely neglect the signalling role of the mechanisms and assume that each principal follows the same o¤er strategy independently of her type. The game G would then be essentially the same as a standard game with uninformed principals: As in a standard game, the mechanisms of each principal would respond to the agent's messages with a potentially random allocation, except that now this randomness may depend on the communication strategy and type of the principal. The analysis of G would then be dramatically simpler.
Unfortunately, when the agent simultaneously interacts with multiple informed principals, the Inscrutability Principle fails. This happens because, conditional on the information revealed by principal i's o¤er, how the agent communicates with i may now depend not only on his exogenous type but also on his endogenous information about i's opponents, which includes their o¤ers and how he communicates with them. Furthermore, the agent's communication with principal i's opponents-and hence with i herself-may change depending on the information revealed by principal i's o¤ers. Because of this interdependence, if in equilibrium principal i reveals some information up front, then the agent can induce a social-choice function that exhibits correlation between i's information and the allocations with all principals. However, the agent clearly cannot induce the same correlation if principal i reveals no information up front. The next example illustrates these points.
Example 1 (Failure of the Inscrutability Principle) There are two principals. Principal 1 has two equally-likely types: 1 = 1 ; 1 with b( 1 ) = 1=2. Principal 2 and the agent are uninformed: j 0 j = j 2 j = 1. For each principal there are two possible allocations: X 1 = fx 1 ; x 1 g and X 2 = fx 2 ; x 2 g. The sets of messages are P 1 = fp 1 ; p 1 g, A 1 = fa 1 ; a 1 g, A 2 = fa 2 ; a 2 g; for simplicity, I neglect P 2 . Table 1 reports the players' payo¤s; in each cell, the …rst entry is principal 1's payo¤, the second is principal 2's, and the third is the agent's. Note that the agent's preference over X 1 depends on x 2 . So, from the point of view of principal 1, the agent can have endogenous information to the extent that the …nal x 2 depends on the mechanism of principal 2 and on how the agent communicates with it. Moreover, the agent's preference over X 1 X 2 depends on 1 . Therefore, if the agent learns 1 by observing principal 1's o¤ers, his endogenous information about x 2 can change. I will construct an equilibrium that sustains the social-choice function f ( 1 ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ) and f ( 1 ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ). Note that f 'matches'both x 1 and x 2 with principal 1's type.
In this equilibrium, principal 2 o¤ers a mechanism m 2 such that m 2 (a 2 ) = x 2 and m 2 (a 2 ) = x 2 . Principal 1 o¤ers the mechanism m 1 if her type is 1 , and m 1 if her type is 1 , where
and m 1 (a; p) = 8 < :
Since m 1 and m 1 di¤er, principal 1 reveals her type up front. For m 1 2 fm 1 ; m 1 g, her communication strategy is 1 1 ; m 1 = p 1 and 1 ( 1 ; m 1 ) = p 1 . Finally, when the agent is o¤ered m 2 and either m 1 or m 1 , his communication strategy is
Note that according to (1) , the agent selects di¤erent allocations by communicating to m 2 depending on whether principal 1 o¤ers m 1 or m 1 . For other mechanisms m 2 and m 1 = 2 fm 1 ; m 1 g, one can extend , 1 , and so that they constitute a continuation equilibrium. In particular, …xing ( 1 ; 1 ), extend as follows: if m 2 allows the agent to choose only x 2 , then he sends the message a 1 to m 1 and a 1 to m 1 ; if instead m 2 allows the agent to choose only x 2 , then he sends message a 1 both to m 1 and to m 1 . It is easy to see that the strategy ( 1 ; 1 ) admits no pro…table deviation given and 2 -principal 1 is getting her maximal payo¤ of 4. Principal 2 is also maximizing her payo¤ given ( 1 ; 1 ) and . Finally, given the updated belief
There is, however, no equilibrium of G and no mechanism m 1 with the property that both types of principal 1 o¤er m 1 and the equilibrium social-choice function is f . If both types of principal 1 o¤er the same mechanism, the agent does not learn her type. Therefore, even if principal 2 allows the agent to choose between x 2 and x 2 , he cannot match the two principals' allocations as required by f : With positive probability, he will choose either x 2 when 1 = 1 , or x 2 when 1 = 1 .
We have therefore reached the following important conclusion. In contrast to non-delegation games with one informed principal, when studying the outcomes of non-delegation games with multiple informed principals one can no longer disregard that, in equilibrium, the principals may use their choices of mechanisms to signal their types.
Failure of the Extended Taxation Principle
In this section, I turn my attention to the literature on common agency with uninformed principals. An important result in this literature is the so called Extended Taxation Principle, or Menu Theorem (Peters (2001); Martimort and Stole (2002) ). Loosely speaking, this Principle says the following: Given an arbitrary game with uninformed principals G un , there exists a simpler game G L in which principals are restricted to o¤ering only menus of decisions, and such that any equilibrium social-choice function that arises in G un also arises in G L and vice versa. As I will momentarily show, when principals are informed, the Extended Taxation Principle does not apply; this happens for two reasons. First, an informed principal may use her indirect mechanisms not only to constrain the agent to choose from a speci…c menu of decisions, but also to signal her private information by framing such a menu in di¤erent ways. Second, in nondelegation games, an informed principal can also use her mechanisms to retain some ability to in ‡uence the …nal decisions through her messages, while revealing up front as little information as she wishes. Such a ‡exibility is, however, impossible if the principal can only o¤er menus of decisions.
To prove my claims, I …rst need to introduce the notion of menu and recall the statement of the Extended Taxation Principle. A menu is simply a 'list'of decisions that the agent can choose by naming one. Formally, we can de…ne menus as follows.
14 De…nition 3 (Simple Menus) For i = 1; : : : ; N , a menu l i is a mechanism such that (1) the message space of the agent, A l i , is a nonempty subset of D i and (2) 
Let the set of available menus for principal i be L i , and let G L be the 'menu game'in which each principal i is restricted to o¤ering menus in L i .
To be able to replicate all social-choice functions sustained by equilibria of a more general game G un , in which uninformed principals compete in arbitrary mechanisms, the game G L must be su¢ ciently comparable to G un in terms of the principals'ability to a¤ect their decisions with the agent. Intuitively, if in G un principal i can (not) o¤er a mechanism that allows the agent to induce a decision d i , then in G L principal i should (not) be able to o¤er a menu that contains d i . This intuitive requirement is usually captured with the notion of enlargement (see also Pavan and Calzolari (2010) ).
De…nition 4 (Enlargement) The game G
un is an enlargement of the game G L if, for every i = 1; : : : ; N , we have that for every menu l i 2 L i there exists a mechanism m i 2 M i such that Ra(m i ) = Ra(l i ), and vice versa. In the rest of this section, I provide two counterexamples to this result for games with informed principals-that is, if one replaces G un with G or G d . These examples also allow me to develop the intuition behind my main results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
The …rst example shows that the Extended Taxation Principle does not apply to delegation games G d . The reason is as follows. In games with uninformed principals the Extended Taxation Principle holds because, by o¤ering an arbitrary indirect mechanism, each principal is e¤ectively restricting the agent to choosing from a speci…c menu of decisions. So, if in the menu game G L each principal i can rely on an appropriately rich set of menus L i , then the equilibrium outcomes of G L should-and indeed are-the same as in the original game. In contrast, in a delegation game G d , by choosing her mechanisms each informed principal not only de…nes a menu of available choices for the agent, but she may also signal some of her information by framing such a menu in a speci…c way. So in G L , even if each principal can o¤er the same menus as she does in G d through arbitrary mechanisms (as required by the notion of enlargement), she cannot frame them in di¤erent ways and therefore she loses part of the ability to signal her types. As a result, some of the equilibrium social-choice functions that arise in
Example 2 (Failure of the Extended Taxation Principle for G d ) As in example 1, there are two principals, 1 = f 1 ; 1 g with b( 1 ) = 1=2, and j 0 j = j 2 j = 1. Their feasible allocations are X 1 = fx 1 ; x 1 g and X 2 = fx 2 ; x 0 2 ; x 2 g. For simplicity, both principals can only o¤er mechanisms of the form m i : A i ! X i -i.e., m i can induce only degenerate lotteries over X i -where A 1 = fa 1 ; a 1 g and A 2 = fa 2 ; a 0 2 ; a 2 g. Table 4 reports the players'payo¤s. I construct an equilibrium of G d that sustains the social-choice function f ( 1 ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ) and f ( 1 ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ). In this equilibrium, principal 2 o¤ers a mechanism m 2 such that Ra(m 2 ) = fx 2 ; x 2 g. Principal 1 o¤ers the mechanism m 1 if her type is 1 , and m 1 otherwise, where
Then, on path the agent updates his beliefs to ( 1 j m 1 ; m 2 ) = ( 1 j m 1 ; m 2 ) = 1. Also, assume that these beliefs do not change after unilateral deviations of principal 2. The agent communicates using the following strategy : given (m 1 ; m 2 ), he chooses x 2 with principal 2 and sends the message a 1 to m 1 ; given (m 1 ; m 2 ), he chooses x 2 with principal 2 and sends the message a 1 to m 1 . Moreover, whenever the mechanism of principal 2 lets the agent choose x 0 2 , he does so and sends the message a 1 both to m 1 and to m 1 . Again, one can appropriately de…ne the agent's beliefs and behavior after deviations by principal 1 without a¤ecting the message of the example. It is immediate to see that the strategy admits no pro…table deviation given , 1 , and 2 . Also, 1 is a best reply to 2 and . Finally, principal 2 has no pro…table deviation: If she allows the agent to choose x 0 2 , her payo¤ falls to zero because he then chooses the 'wrong'
There
On the one hand, if both types of principal 1 o¤er the same menu with x 1 and x 1 , then the agent will induce the same lottery over X 1 , independently of 1 . On the other hand, if either type of principal 1 o¤ers the menu containing only her preferred x 1 , then principal 2 cannot be deterred from o¤ering x 0 2 .
Example 2 shows that in the menu game G L principal 1 faces a trade-o¤, which is absent in G d , between de…ning the menus of available decisions for the agent and signalling her type. To signal her type using only menus, principal 1 must exclude from one of them a 'latent contract' that, in the equilibrium of G d , allows her to deter a deviation of principal 2 by relying on the self-interest of the agent.
The Extended Taxation Principle also fails in non-delegation games G. One reason of this failure is the same as in the case of delegation games: In the menu game G L , principal i may not be able to restrict the available decisions for the agent to a speci…c menu, and at the same time signal as much information as she does in G. But in the case of non-delegation games, the issue may also be the opposite. Speci…cally, in G each principal can retain some power to in ‡uence the …nal decisions, through her messages, at the moment when the agent communicates with her and her opponents. Instead in G L , to in ‡uence the agent's decisions, each principal can only restrict his options to di¤erent menus; moreover, she must do so before the agent communicates with her opponents. So, in G L a principal may face a trade-o¤ between restricting the agent's options to the decisions that her type prefers and revealing too much-rather than too littleinformation, which the agent could then use against her with her opponents. In contrast, in G each principal can reveal as little information as she wishes, while still in ‡uencing the …nal decisions. The next example illustrates these points. ; a 1 g and P 1 = fp 1 ; p 1 g. Suppose that the set L i allows principal i to 'o¤er' all nonempty subsets of X i ; then G is an enlargement of G L . Regarding players' payo¤s, consider the two possibilities in Table 2 and 3. In Table 2 , both principal 2's and the agent's payo¤s are independent of 1 (private values). Instead, in Table 3 , the agent's payo¤s depend on 1 (common values). 
As in example 1, when m 1 6 = m 1 or l 2 6 = l 2 , one can complete , 1 , and to obtain a continuation equilibrium.
I claim that the strategy pro…le that I have just described-together with the belief ( 1 j m 1 ; l 2 ) = b( 1 ) for all m 1 ; l 2 -is an equilibrium of G. First, both types of principal 1 get their maximal payo¤s by playing 1 against ( ; 2 ). Furthermore, admits no pro…table deviation because choosing x 0 2 is the unique best reply of the agent to ( 1 ; 1 ), and if x 0 2 is not available, it is optimal for him to select x 2 (or x 00 2 ) and then send any message to m 1 . Therefore, ( 1 ; 1 ) is optimal for principal 1. To see that principal 2 has no pro…table deviation, note that any menu l 2 that 'includes' x 0 2 is equivalent to l 2 ; on the other hand, the agent's strategy in (2) together with ( 1 ; 1 ) prevents principal 2 from gaining if she deviates to a menu l 2 that does not include x 0 2 (i.e., such that x 0 2 = 2 A l 2 ). However, no equilibrium of the menu game G L can sustain f -this is true for both payo¤ speci…cations, but for di¤erent reasons as I explain shortly. 15 Suppose in negation that such an equilibrium exists. Since f speci…es a di¤erent x 1 depending on the type of principal 1, in the equilibrium of G L 1 and 1 cannot o¤er the same menu; otherwise, the agent would (randomly) induce the same allocation with both types. It follows that, to sustain f , at least one of principal 1's types must o¤er only the allocation that she likes best; so, principal 1 must reveal her type up front. Finally, given his degenerate beliefs, the agent selects x 0 2 with principal 2 if and only if she o¤ers the menu l 2 that contains only x 0 2 (i.e., with A l 2 = fx 0 2 g). This o¤er strategy, however, is not optimal for principal 2: if she o¤ers the menu l 15 See also the discussion in Tirole (1990-1992) about the di¤erences between private-and commonvalue assumptions. 16 In the common-value case, the agent would still choose x 0 2 with principal 2, if her deviation to l 0 2 caused the agent not to update at all his beliefs about 1 even though principal 1 has not deviated from her strategy. Although this is technically possible, it seems implausible (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ).
Example 3 helps us better understand how G L restricts, relative to G, the principals'ability to in ‡uence the …nal outcomes of the game. In G L , to achieve the decision that best …ts her type, principal 1 must o¤er a menu that includes only that decision, thereby revealing her type. But if she does so, she makes the agent take undesirable decisions with principal 2. The reason in the common-value case is simple: By revealing her type up front, principal 1 directly a¤ects the agent's preference over her opponent's allocations. In the example, after discovering the true 1 , the agent knows whether x 2 or x 00 2 is the best allocation that he can get with principal 2. The private-value case, instead, is more subtle. Even if principal 1 reveals her type up front, she has no direct e¤ect on the agent's preference. Nonetheless, recall that the agent's preference over X 2 endogenously depends on x 1 . Therefore, if principal 1 reduces the agent's uncertainty about the …nal x 1 by committing to a menu, she can still induce an undesirable x 2 . In the example, when the agent is uncertain about the …nal x 1 that principal 1 will choose using her messages, he prefers the safe allocation x 0 2 with principal 2. But when the agent is not uncertain about x 1 because he himself chooses it from a menu, then if he can, he will choose either x 2 or x 00 2 . To summarize, the examples in this and the previous section have unveiled the main strategic components of the games with informed principals. Speci…cally, in delegation games, the principals use their mechanisms for two key purposes: (1) to specify menus of available decisions for the agent; (2) to signal their information. In games with multiple uninformed principals only the …rst purpose matters-as shown by the Extended Taxation Principle. In contrast, in games with multiple informed principals the second purpose becomes important, which is perhaps the key novelty of the present model. Moreover, in non-delegation games each principal also uses her mechanisms for a third purpose: to partake in choosing an allocation-acting on her private information-after the agent has communicated with her opponents.
A Simple Characterization of Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section, I build on the insights from Sections 3 and 4 to construct new games that are simpler than the general games described in Section 2, but are capable of replicating all the equilibrium social-choice functions that arise in those general games. As noted, the new games should allow each principal to o¤er the agent appropriately de…ned choice sets as well as to signal her types, without introducing new trade-o¤s between these two goals.
As far as signalling is concerned, it takes a relatively simple form in equilibria in which principals play deterministic o¤er strategies. This important feature is shared by delegation and non-delegation games; it is therefore worth discussing it now. When principal i o¤ers mechanisms as a deterministic function of her types, with each o¤er she simply signals that her type is in a speci…c subset of i . In other words, each deterministic o¤er strategy of principal i de…nes a partition of i , with each element of the partition containing all types that o¤er the same mechanism. In contrast, if principal i played a mixed o¤er strategy, she would give rise to a more complicated pattern of signals. Since each of her types could o¤er many mechanisms with di¤erent probabilities, we could no longer describe the resulting signal structure only in terms of i .
Therefore, to replicate all social-choice functions sustained by equilibria of G d and G, the new games will have to allow each principal to achieve the form of signalling that I have just described, while o¤ering the agent di¤erent choice sets. I begin by considering the delegation games.
Delegation Games
For any delegation game G d , I consider a new game that is equivalent to the standard menu game of Peters (2001) , except that it also endows each principal with a set of 'cheap-talk'signals. I show that this new game can replicate all social-choice functions sustained by the equilibria of G d . This result implies that we can study the equilibrium outcomes of any game G d using a very simple extension of Peters'menu game.
I refer to my new game as the 'signal-menu'game, which I denote by G SL . In this game, each principal i does two things: (1) she o¤ers menus from the set L i (De…nition 3), and (2) provided that her menu contains more than just the default decision d i -which means that she is actively participating in the game-she sends a signal from the set S i = i . 17 After observing the menus and the signals of all principals, the agent chooses a decision from each menu. Therefore, the game G SL works very similarly to Peters' menu game except that, unless a principal is not actively participating in the game, she can also give the agent some information about her type using her signals. To capture this formally, for each principal i, let l i be the menu that contains only d i (i.e., A l i = f d i g). Then, in G SL , the action space of principal i is fS i L i n l i g [ f l i g, and a signal-o¤er strategy i speci…es, for each i , a lottery over i's action space. The agent's strategy is a map that, for every pro…le of signals^ and menus l, speci…es a lottery over the pro…les of messages A l . As for the original game G d , the term equilibrium of G SL refers to a weak PBE in which, after observing her type, every principal i chooses deterministically a menu and a signal-that is, if for every i = 1; : : : ; N and i 2 i , i ( i ) is a degenerate lottery over i's action space.
To replicate all equilibrium social-choice functions that arise in G d , the new game G SL must satisfy two requirements: (1) in G SL , the principals must be as able to a¤ect the agent's decisions by specifying his available choices as they are in G d ; (2) in G SL , the principals must also be as able to a¤ect the agent's decisions by signalling their information as they are in G d . To satisfy requirement (1), which also applies to games with uninformed principals, I follow the literature using the notion of enlargement: I will say that G d is an enlargement of G SL if and only if they satisfy the conditions of De…nition 4, where G d replaces G un and G SL replaces G L . Note that, to …nd the G SL that satis…es this de…nition for a given G d , we can treat G d as a game with uninformed principals, derive the standard menu game that satis…es De…nition 4, and then simply endow each principal with a set of signals equal to her set of types as suggested above. This last step should also ensure that requirement (2) is satis…ed, given the simple form of signalling that principals can achieve in an equilibrium of G d . Indeed, Theorem 1 below con…rms this intuition.
There exists an equilibrium of G d that sustains the social-choice function f if and only if there exists an equilibrium of G SL that sustains f .
To understand the intuition behind Theorem 1, consider …rst an equilibrium of G d . As noted, in such an equilibrium, by playing the mechanism m i principal i signals that her type is in some subset T i (m i ) of i . So, in G SL we can let all types in T i (m i ) o¤er the menu l i containing the same decisions that the agent can induce through m i , and send him a common signal^ i 2 T i (m i )-of course, unless l i = l i . 18 By replicating this procedure for each type of each principal, we construct a pro…le of o¤er strategies in G SL . Note that according to this construction, after each on-path pro…le of menus and signals, the agent has the same information and available choices as he has after the corresponding on-path pro…le of mechanisms in the equilibrium of G d . Therefore, it must be optimal for him to induce the same decisions as he does in G d . Similarly, it must be optimal for each type of each principal to o¤er the menu and send the signal as speci…ed. This intuitively explains why every social-choice function sustained by an equilibrium of G d is also a social-choice function sustained by an equilibrium of G SL . Showing the converse is more delicate. By the de…nition of enlargement, each menu of decisions that principal i can o¤er in G SL can also be o¤ered in G d through some indirect mechanism. However, this is not enough: It is also important that each principal can achieve, in G d , the same degree of signaling that she achieves in the equilibrium of G SL . On the one hand, in G SL menus and signals are separated and principal i can combine them in any way she wants (provided that she is actively participating in the game). On the other hand, in G d her signals are intertwined with the di¤erent ways in which she lets the agent's messages map to a choice set. Nonetheless, the agent's message spaces in G d are rich enough to ensure that each principal can always design as many di¤erent indirect mechanisms as she needs to achieve the desired degree of signaling, while o¤ering the same bundle of decisions. Because of this property, we can essentially reverse the construction that I sketched before, now going from an equilibrium of G SL to an equilibrium of G d that sustains the same social-choice function.
Non-Delegation Games
In this section, I consider the non-delegation game G. I will construct a new game that is simpler than G, but replicates all social-choice functions sustained by the equilibria of G.
My new game has two periods as does G and proceeds as follows. In the …rst period, each principal o¤ers the agent a list of restricted direct mechanisms (RDMs), simultaneously with her opponents. Intuitively, an RDM of principal i is a standard direct mechanism that depends only on i's reports about her types, except that it restricts such reports to a subset of all her possible types. A list of RDMs of principal i is simply a collection of such RDMs, all restricting her reports to the same subset of types. In the second period of the game, after privately observing the o¤ers of all principals, the agent chooses an RDM from each list. Finally, each principal submits her report before observing the RDM chosen by the agent.
I will now formally describe my new game, starting from the lists of RDMs. For every principal i and nonempty subset T i of i , denote the set of RDMs restricted to T i by
Intuitively, a list of RDMs restricted to T i corresponds to a subset of R T i from which the agent chooses an option by simply naming it. 18 Note that if in the equilibrium of G d two (or more) types of principal i choose not to actively participate in the game-i.e., they both o¤er the unique mechanism m i with Ra (m i ) = d i -they have no possibility of di¤erentiating themselves in the eyes of the agent. Therefore, they should also not have this possibility in G SL after o¤ering l i .
De…nition 5 (List of RDMs) Fix principal i and a nonempty T i i . A list of direct mechanisms restricted to T i -denoted by
T i -is a function T i : A T i ! R T i such that (1) the message space of the agent, A T i , is a nonempty subset of R T i , and (2) T i is the identity function, i.e., T i (r T i ) = r T i . Finally, the set of all possible lists of RDMs of principal i is i .
Based on this de…nition, I denote my new game by G . In this game, the strategy of principal i involves an o¤er strategy i and a communication strategy i , where i assigns to each i a lottery over i and i assigns to each ( i ; T i ) a lottery over the restricted set of reports T i . The communication strategy of the agent speci…es, for each pro…le T = ( T 1 ; : : : ; T N ), a lottery over A T . As before, the term equilibrium of G refers to a weak PBE in which, for every principal i and type i , i ( i ) is a degenerate lottery over i .
To be able to replicate all social-choice functions that arise in the non-delegation game G, the new game G and the original one G must be su¢ ciently comparable. To denote when G and G are comparable, I will use an appropriate de…nition of enlargement as I did for delegation games in Section 5.1. To state this de…nition, I …rst need to show how we can combine any indirect mechanism m i and communication strategy i in G to obtain a list of RDMs. For each message a i of the agent, we can use m i (a i ; ) and i to construct a direct mechanism r i by de…ning the probability that r i assigns to the allocation x i given the report i by
If we now repeat the same construction for each message a i 2 A i , we identify a subset of R As noted, the combination of any indirect mechanism m i and communication strategy i in G results in a list of RDMs i . So, condition (1) requires that such a list be feasible for principal i in G . Conversely, condition (2) requires that a list i be infeasible for principal i in G if in G she has no mechanism m i and communication strategy i whose combination results in i . Finally, condition (3) requires that the whole set i could be obtained by considering every feasible list of unrestricted direct mechanisms i and by restricting all its mechanism to T i , for every nonempty subset T i of i .
Since in G the principals will play RDMs, it would be desirable to restrict attention to equilibria in which-at least on path-they report truthfully their type to their RDMs. The next de…nition and lemma show that one can do so without loss of generality.
De…nition 7 (Truthful Equilibrium) An equilibrium of G is a (principal) truthful equilibrium if, for every principal i and i 2 i , we have i ( i ; i ( i )) = i .
Lemma 1
Truthful equilibria represent a simple and intuitive class of equilibria of G . Moreover, the set of social-choice functions sustained by truthful equilibria of G coincides with the set of social-choice functions sustained by the equilibria of G.
Theorem 2 Let G be an enlargement of G . There exists an equilibrium of G that sustains the social-choice function f if and only if there exists a truthful equilibrium of G that sustains f .
Intuitively, the new game G can replicate all social-choice functions sustained by equilibria of G, because in G each principal maintains the same ability to in ‡uence the …nal decisions with the agent that she has in G. To see this, recall that in G each principal uses her indirect mechanisms for two purposes: to specify a set of decisions from which she and the agent will choose one using their messages, and to signal her information.
Consider the …rst purpose. On the one hand, if principal i retains some decision power through her messages, it means that she only lets the agent use his messages to select a subset of decisions from which she e¤ectively chooses the …nal one. Furthermore, when principal i sends her messages, she only knows her type and the mechanism that she has o¤ered to the agent. Therefore, to retain all her decision power, principal i only needs to assign to any message of the agent a subset that only contains one decision for each of her possible types. On the other hand, principal i may want to let the agent select di¤erent subsets of decisions depending on his exogenous type and endogenous information about her opponents (recall the discussion in Section 3 about the failure of the Inscrutability Principle). To do so, principal i could o¤er mechanisms that assign a subset of decisions to each report of the agent about his exogenous and endogenous information. Such a report, however, would involve a description of the mechanisms o¤ered by i's opponents and of how these mechanisms respond to reports about i's mechanisms, causing an in…nite regress. To avoid this problem, principal i could simply o¤er the agent a list of subsets of decisions and let him directly choose among these subsets. It is easy to see that any list of subsets, each containing one decision for each type of the principal, is equivalent to a list of direct mechanisms, each letting principal i choose a …nal decision by reporting her type.
Consider now the signalling purpose that indirect mechanisms have in G. As noted, in an equilibrium of G, by choosing a mechanism principal i at most signals that her true type is in a speci…c subset, say T i , of her set of types i . So, if principal i could o¤er a list of direct mechanisms that commit her to reporting only the types in T i , she could signal to the agent that her true type is in T i . This is the basic idea behind letting principal i o¤er lists of RDMs, so that she can use the domain of these RDMs as her signalling device.
These remarks and Theorem 2 also help us understand why it is without loss of generality, with regard to the equilibrium social-choice functions, to assume that in G the principals communicate with their mechanisms simultaneously with the agent. 19 To see this, consider a game G 0 that is identical to G, except that in G 0 each principal chooses her messages after observing the message that the agent has sent to her mechanism. From this observation principal i may learn something about the agent's type and her opponents'types and mechanisms. Conditional on this information, however, i's choices of messages depend only on her type. Thus, for the same reason that applies to G, principal i only needs lists of RDMs to be able to in ‡uence the …nal decisions with the agent as she does in G 0 . Furthermore, principal i can always o¤er lists of RDMs such that, conditional on what she learns from the agent's choice of an RDM, she wants to truthfully report her type to it. Therefore, we lose nothing if each principal has to report her types before observing the agent's choice of an RDM. Also, note that the agent only cares about the distribution over allocations that his choices of RDMs can induce. For these reasons, if an equilibrium of G 0 sustains the social-choice function f , then there is a truthful equilibrium of G that sustains f . Theorem 2 then implies that every social-choice function that arises in G 0 also arises in G.
There is a similarity between the logic behind the last remark and that behind the Inscrutability Principle. Roughly speaking, the Inscrutability Principle says that the single informed principal need not covey any information to the agent, because her information has no impact on the agent's exogenous information, which is what ultimately matters for the …nal decisions. Therefore, the Principle justi…es restricting attention to simpler games in which the informed principal must o¤er the same mechanism independently of her type. Similarly, the previous remark says that the endogenously informed agent need not convey any information to the principals, because his information has no impact on the principals'exogenous information, which again ultimately determines their …nal decisions. Again, this justi…es restricting attention to simpler games in which each informed principal communicates with her mechanism simultaneously with the agent.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have considered common-agency games in which principals have private information. I have shown that the set of equilibrium outcomes of these games depends on the principals'ability to signal their information through their choices of mechanisms. This property explains why both the Inscrutability and the Extended Taxation Principle fail in these games. Finally, I have shown how to characterize the equilibrium outcomes of general delegation and non-delegation games, using new games that are simpler than the original ones but ensure that each principal retains the same ability to in ‡uence the …nal decisions of the agent.
Common-agency games with informed principals provide a useful framework to analyze many situations of economic interest, including competition in menu auctions, in oligopolistic markets, or in lobbying contests. Applying my results to study how the outcomes in these situations depend on the principals'private information-e.g., in terms of e¢ ciency or ability to aggregate dispersed information-represents an interesting avenue for future research. Given the o¤er strategy i of principal i, let i ( i ) be the set of mechanisms that are o¤ered by some i in equilibrium. For every i , it is possible to identify the subset
is a partition of i with at most j i j elements. De…ne the function # i : i ( i ) ! i such that, for every
The same construction applies to every principal i. Now consider the agent's strategy . If a pro…le of signals^ and menus l in on path (i.e., it equals ( 0 ) for some 0 ), then I claim that f ( ) = f ( ) for every . This is immediate because, for every 0 , the principals give the agent the same selection of pro…les of decisions, and for every l on path, every 0 induces the same distribution over pro…les of decisions as in the original equilibrium after the corresponding pro…le ( 0 ). Now consider the agent's updated belief . Suppose the pro…le (^ ; l) is on path. This means that 1 [ ( 0 )=(^ ;l)] > 0 for some 0 . Thus, we have for every 0
where m(^ ; l) is the pro…le of mechanisms that I used before to de…ne on path. For every (^ ; l) o¤ path, constructm as before and let ( j 0 ;^ ; l) = ( j 0 ;m). Given the agent's belief , it follows that the strategy is sequentially rational. Take any (^ ; l) on path-the same argument applies if (^ ; l) is o¤ path. Given (^ ; l), the agent's set of available decisions and his belief over 0 coincide with the set and belief that he had after observing m(^ ; l) in the original equilibrium ; moreover, induces the same distribution over decisions as did . Therefore, the agent cannot have a pro…table deviation from .
Given i and , no principal i has a pro…table deviation from i . Suppose to the contrary that for some i there exists an action (^ i ; l i ) (or l i ) such that
is on the path of play under i , then it means that l i corresponds to somẽ
Otherwise, letm i be the indirect mechanism I used in constructing o¤ path. Because the probability over outcomes that i induces after deviating to (^ i ; l i ) given i and is identical to that induced after deviating tom i given i and , it must be that
A contradiction. Part 2: (() Let ( ; ) be an equilibrium of G SL . I now derive an equilibrium ( ; ) of G d , and show that f = f . Consider the strategy i for principal i. Let Ra( i ) be the set of signals and menus that principal i can o¤er according to i . For every (^ i ; l i ) 2 Ra( i ), let S i (l i ) be the set of signals that principal i sends while o¤ering l i . Now construct jS i (l i )j indirect mechanisms m i (l i ) with Ra(m i (l i )) = A l i . This can be done because G d is an enlargement of G SL and j i j jA i j for every i = 1; : : : ; N . Speci…cally, choose j i j messages in A i and label the elements in A l i , other than the 'default'option x i , each time starting with a di¤erent element from the set of j i j selected messages. And when you get to x i , assign all remaining messages in A i to this option. This procedure delivers j i j di¤erent indirect mechanisms whose image equals the menu l i . Then, assign one of these mechanisms to each^ i 2 S i (l i ) and denote it by m i (^ i ; l i ). Now, with a slight abuse of notation, let principal i strategy in
Finally, apply the same construction to obtain the o¤er strategy of every principal i. Now consider the agent's strategy . If m is on path, then let I claim that f = f . This is because any pro…le of principals'types 0 o¤ers the agent the same choice set under and . Furthermore, given an array of mechanisms, the agent conditions the distribution over decisions on the speci…c designs of such indirect mechanisms as he was conditioning on the signals in the equilibrium of G SL .
Consider now the agent's beliefs. Suppose …rst that the pro…le m is on path according to . Then, for every 0 and 0
If insteadm is o¤ path. Let (~ ;l) be the pro…le of signals and menus that I constructed before to de…ne o¤ path, and let
I claim that the pro…le ( ; ) is an equilibrium of G d . With regard to the agent's strategy, after any pro…le m that is on path, the agent has the same beliefs and induces the same distributions over pro…les of decisions as after the pro…le of menus and signals (( ) 1 (m)). Hence, he cannot have any pro…table deviation. Ifm is o¤ path, the same argument applies. With regard to the principals'strategies, suppose some i of some principal i has a pro…table deviation to a mechanismm i , that is
Then it means that the way that the agent interprets i 's deviation in forming his beliefs and the resulting distribution over decisions make i strictly better o¤. On the other hand, by construction the deviation tom i is equivalent to o¤eringl i with Al i = Ra(m i ) and send the signal~ i that I used in the construction of and above. Since the agent is responding to i as he was responding to i , it follows that
A contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let ( ; ) be an equilibrium of G . I will construct a truthful equilibrium of G that sustains f = f . Consider …rst principal i. For every i , let 20 and let
Repeating this operation and collecting the resulting RDMs, we obtain the new list
20 Given a RDM r Ti ( ) and a communicatin strategy i ( ; Ti ), the operation simply reduces the compound lottery de…ned by r Ti ( ) and i ( ; Ti ) to obtain a direct mechanism as in (3).
Finally, repeat the same construction for every principal i. Now consider the agent. Suppose …rst that T is on path under . Then, for every 0 and every r T 2 A T , let
. Also, using Bayes rule it follows that on path, for every ,
where again
To see this, note that for every , both through ( ; ) and through ( ; ), the principals' essentially give the agent the possibility to choose among the same pro…les of lotteries over allocations; furthermore, the agent actually induces the same distribution over such pro…les under as well as under . To complete the construction of the equilibrium ( ; ), for every T o¤ path let ( ; ; T ) = ( ; ; T ) and ( j ; T ) = ( j ; T ). Using the assumption that ( ; ) is an equilibrium of G , it follows that the pro…le ( ; ) is also an equilibrium of G . Furthermore, ( ; ) is a truthful equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2
Part 1: ()) Let ( ; ) be an equilibrium of G sustaining f . I will construct a truthful equilibrium ( ; ) of G that sustains f . Given the o¤er strategy i of principal i, let i ( i ) be the set of mechanisms that are o¤ered by some i in the equilibrium. For every i identify the subset
i , that is the set of types of principal i who o¤er the same mechanism i ( i ). Using the communication strategy i and the function c( ; i ), 21 for every i recover the list of DMs i ( i ) = c( i ( i ); i ) that corresponds to the mechanism o¤ered by i under i . Finally, for every i identify the list of RDM
. By construction, for every i and
Finally, repeat the same construction for every principal i to obtain the pro…le of o¤er strategies . Now consider the communication strategies of the principals and the agent on path. For every i of principal i, let i ( i ; i ( i )) = i . With regard to the agent, given T on path, let m(
, and for every r
is the set of messages that allowed the agent to induce a pro…le of DMs 21 Recall the discussion before De…nition 6.
(given ) such that, if we restrict each of them to the corresponding T i , we obtain r T . Then for each 0 , let (r T ; 0 ; T ) = P a2A(r T ) (a; 0 ; m( T )).
To derive the on-path beliefs of the agent, we can use Bayes rule as follows: for every 0 ; 0 and T on path Using this result, we can see that ( ; ) is a continuation equilibrium given any T on path and . This is because, given any ( 0 ; T ) on path, the agent has the same belief over 0 and, given , he expects the same distribution over outcomes by playing as when he was playing after ( 0 ; m( T )). Furthermore, given the agent can't induce any distribution over outcomes that he couldn't induce after m( T ) given . Similarly, each i of principal i can't have a pro…table deviation from her truthful strategy after o¤ering T i , because any such deviation was available also in the original game after o¤ering m i ( T i ).
If
T is o¤ path and involves deviations by more than one principal, choose any belief for the agent ( j ; T ) and equilibrium of the resulting continuation game-…niteness of A T and 0 ensures the existence of at least one continuation equilibrium. Now consider T i ) 2 (T i ) be any best reply to and i . We have that, for any principal i, no type i can pro…t from such a deviation because it was already available to i in the equilibrium of the original game G. The remaining case is when T is o¤ path (in the sense that it can't occur with positive probability according to i ) and only principal i has deviated for some i . I claim that there must exist a continuation equilibrium that makes such a deviation unpro…table. Suppose to the contrary that i of principal i deviates to o¤ering^ T i o¤ path, whereas all other principals follow i , and that for any choice of ( j ; (^ T i ; T i ))-where T i results from i -any continuation equilibrium can't deter i from such a deviation. I will argue that then ( ; ) can't be an equilibrium of G, which is a contradiction. To see this recall that, since G is an enlargement of G , for such an^ T i there exist an indirect mechanismm i and a communication strategy~ i (m i ) for such a mechanism, such that restricting the DMs in the list c(m i ;~ i ) to T i delivers^ T i . Hence, consider the mechanismm i such that, for every i 2 T i , there is a message p i ( i ) such thatm i ( ; p i ( i )) =m i ( ;~ i ( i ;m i )) and, for every p i = 2 fp i ( i )g i 2T i , m i ( ; p i ) =m i ( ; p i ( 0 i )) where 0 i is the element of T i with the lowest index-this choice is just for convenience. Then, for type i of principal i, o¤eringm i in G followed by the message p i ( i ) is essentially equivalent to o¤ering^ T i in G followed by the report i . Now, given any realization m i according to i , the set of distribution over outcomes that the agent can induce after (m i ; m i ) given (^ i ; i ) is the same as after the corresponding pro…le (^ T i ; T i ) given , if we de…ne^ i to play p i ( i ) afterm i with the same probability with which i plays i after^ T i . By assumption, it is not possible to …nd a belief and a strategy so that is a best reply to and vice versa, and i of principal i doesn't pro…t by deviating to^ T i . But then, given any speci…cation of the agent's belief after (m i ; m i ), there can't be a strategy^ that delivers, together with^ i , a continuation equilibrium such that i of principal i is deterred from o¤erinĝ m i followed by^ i . This contradicts the assumption that ( ; ) is an equilibrium of G. We conclude that it is possible to extend the on-path strategies and beliefs that I have constructed above to obtain an equilibrium ( ; ) of G such that f = f . Part 2: (() Suppose ( ; ) is a truthful equilibrium of G that sustains f . I will construct an equilibrium ( ; ) of G that sustains f .
Consider principal i and her o¤er strategy i . For every T i ) signals the same amount of information about principal i's type as T i because T i and m( T i ) restrict principal i to choose a message in T i and in fp i ( i )g i 2T i , respectively. The second case corresponds to jT i j = 1, which implies that T i is essentially a simple menu. In this case, we can match di¤erent i s to di¤erent mechanisms m i s, even when these mechanisms correspond to the same menu, as in the proof of Theorem 1. So, denote by T i ( i ) the list of RDMs that i o¤ers under i and let m( T i ( i )) be the indirect mechanism that we have just constructed. Then, for every principal i and i , de…ne i ( i ) = m( T i ( i )). Now, consider the on-path communication strategies of the principals and the agent. First, for every principal i and i , let i ( i ; m( T i ( i ))) = p i ( i ) where p i ( i ) was de…ned before. Now consider the agent. Given any pro…le m on path, recover the corresponding T (m ) given the above construction of m . Also, for every r 
